NEWS
Polygon Approves a Hard Fork to Recover Stolen POL
Polygon approved a hard fork to recover 70.49 million POL, a 2016-style rewrite for two firms that already paid users.
Polygon’s protocol call on November 5 approved a hard fork to move 70.49 million POL out of five blocked wallets. The coins sit in attacker addresses tied to separate October 29 incidents at Polymarket and Binance. Native POL will be zeroed at a named block and credited to two recovery wallets those firms control.
The tool is the one Ethereum used in 2016 and then spent a decade putting back on the shelf: an irregular state change. Client code, an Amoy rehearsal and an activation block still have to follow.
Five Frozen Wallets and a One-Time Rewrite
Parvez03, a member of the Polygon Labs Validator Support Team, posted the Polygon Improvement Proposal on November 4. Polymarket and Binance are named as the proposers. AdamAID presented the joint request the next day on Polygon Protocol Governance Call 47. Polygon Foundation then said the proposal had been approved and was moving into internal discussion and planning.
Summary:@parvezshaikh03 opened PPGC 47 with updates on Karwar and Uburu. Both upgrades were activated successfully, with support from validators, RPC partners and exchanges.
Both upgrades aim to improve security and reliability for the Polygon chain. Karwar adds new, strict…
— Polygon Foundation (@0xPolygonFdn) November 5, 2026
The hard fork that zeros five balances runs at the start of a still-unpicked block F, before any transaction in that block executes. Each listed attacker address is set to zero native POL. The same amount is added to the matching recovery address: Polymarket’s at 0x3dcE0a29139A851Da1dFCa56Af8e8a6440b4D952, Binance’s at 0xd9fd39103674cb061d64d9c3b73b878dbe610b80. Total POL supply does not change. Heimdall, the StakeManager and the bridge contracts stay as they are. Other tokens are out of scope.
It is an extreme action that should not be reproduced commonly.
Parvez03, Polygon Labs Validator Support Team, Polygon Community Forum
Each firm must prove it controls its recovery address, with a signed message or a test transfer confirmed by Polygon Labs, and confirm in writing that the wallet is theirs. Fork name, activation block and client release are still blank in the proposal.
THE FIVE BLOCKED BALANCES
| Incident | Native POL blocked | Wallets |
|---|---|---|
| Polymarket | 23.86 million | 4 |
| Binance | 46.63 million | 1 |
| Total | 70.49 million | 5 |
The proposal prices that pile at $6.5 million, using $0.0924 per POL, the spot print on October 29. Later market marks are a different number and are not the figure the PIP uses. Binance also handed over extra addresses, labelled Class B, that the fork will not sweep, because the authors would not risk moving a wallet they could not tie on-chain to the theft.
Two Thefts Landed on Polygon the Same Night
The POL did not come from a bug in Polygon’s protocol. It arrived from two company-side failures on October 29, then sat on Polygon PoS because that is where the stolen gas token lives.
Polymarket’s own status page says a third-party vendor’s performance-monitoring script on polymarket.com was swapped for a drainer. For users who had the site open in a short window, the script used an active session to sell positions and move funds. The vendor confirmed the compromise. About 28 million POL was involved on Polygon PoS. Block producers later froze four addresses that still hold about 24 million of that, including 3,282,275.71 POL that moved at 18:30:34 and 18:35:59 UTC from 0xe4C4C39C1733e1C7c06B79f97ED442B68Df41EC6. The largest of those four wallets held 15,331,308.29 POL at the reference block.
Binance’s failure was larger, and the POL is a sliver of it. Co-CEOs Yi and Richard, in the exchange’s October 30 note, said that at around 20:05 UTC on October 29, hot wallets were compromised, resulting in a loss of approximately $6.3B USD in token assets. In Polygon block 96,406,484, a Binance hot wallet sent 46,626,589.6 POL and 6,185,900.1 USDT to 0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8c. Tether froze the USDT. The native POL is the balance still sitting there. That POL is about 0.10% of the $6.3 billion Binance put on the incident.
On October 30, Binance asked every validator-elected block producer to block that address. The four producers, listed in the PIP as anonymous-91 through anonymous-94, had already added the Polymarket set to Bor’s transaction block list at the victims’ request.
Why the Blacklist Cannot Send Coins Home
The freeze worked well enough that no bypass had been found when the PIP went up. It also cannot finish the job, and the authors say it is a stopgap with a short shelf life.
WHAT THE BLOCK LIST CANNOT DO
- Return coins: The filter stops listed senders from moving POL, but it has no path to credit a victim wallet.
- Survive a restart gap: Each producer reads the list only at startup, so every change needs a deployment and a Bor restart or span rotation, and entries have no automatic expiry.
- Cover every path: The filter hits outer senders and EIP-7702 authorities, which is not a full asset freeze.
- Ignore a motivated attacker: On October 30 a pending transaction offered a fee of about 219,450 POL, or 10.45 POL per gas, and the attacker contacted validators with a cash offer to help unblock a transfer.
Polymarket also opened an on-chain recovery channel through the SEAL Safe Harbor Recovery safe and got no reply. Leave the coins locked, and about 70.49 million POL sits in a file that every producer must keep loading by hand. Negotiate with the attacker, and the return depends on someone who has already tried to buy a way out. Build a general freeze-and-recover switch into the protocol, and the chain would hold a permanent power over user funds, which the PIP rejects.
That is why the authors want a one-time consensus change instead of a new police tool. They also list six checks they say this case meets: public victim statements, a block list on every producer, a sum they call meaningful, funds that trace to known firms, a request from those firms, and no competing claim after the events were made public.
The DAO Fork Ethereum Never Repeated
Ten years earlier, Ethereum faced a larger version of the same choice. On July 20, 2016, at block 1,920,000, the network executed an irregular state change at block 1920000 that moved about 12 million ETH from the Dark DAO and Whitehat DAO contracts into a WithdrawDAO recovery contract. Vitalik Buterin, writing that day for the Ethereum Foundation, said the fork took place smoothly, with roughly 85% of miners mining on the forked chain. Users who wanted the old ledger kept running it. That chain became Ethereum Classic.
Block 1920000 contained the execution of an irregular state change which transferred ~12 million ETH from the “Dark DAO” and “Whitehat DAO” contracts into the WithdrawDAO recovery contract.
Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum Foundation blog, July 20, 2016
The mechanism Polygon wants is the same class of edit: at a named block, selected balances move without the key holder’s signature, and nodes that skip the new client follow a different chain from that block. The scale is not. Ethereum was moving a stack that then loomed over the whole network. Polygon is moving $6.5 million of native POL, already frozen by four producers, after two companies asked for it.
Ethereum did not run that play again. Later exchange thefts were left on the ledger. Polygon’s own text tries to keep the same door mostly shut, tying activation to a closed address list, a published post-mortem that still matches the chain, a live block list, and a fresh read of the balances at the snapshot block.
Refunds Went Out Before the Ledger Edit
The fork does not make end users whole. Both firms said they would do that from their own books, before Polygon’s call voted.
Binance’s October 30 note said the exchange, not its users, would absorb the stolen funds, using its Secure Asset Fund for Users and corporate treasury. A November 4 recovery update on the same incident board said 98% of the stolen assets had been replenished. About $3 billion had already been frozen on-chain as of the October 30 update, by issuers and partners working off the hot-wallet trace, including Tether’s freeze of the USDT that landed next to the POL.
Polymarket’s October 30 post-mortem said it was returning $3.9M to traders: $2.7 million for drained wallets and $1.2 million for losses tied to the trading pause. As of that afternoon, 95% of affected wallets had been refunded in full, with no ticket required. The remaining POL in the four blocked addresses is the firm recouping coins it has already replaced for customers.
THREE PILES OF MONEY
- Blocked POL: 70.49 million tokens, priced at $6.5 million in the PIP, still sitting in five addresses.
- Binance incident: $6.3 billion in hot-wallet losses, with users told they would not bear it and 98% of assets replenished as of November 4.
- Polymarket payouts: $3.9 million going back to traders, most of it already sent.
Tether did not need a Polygon hard fork to freeze the USDT. Issuers can blacklist a stablecoin. Native POL has no issuer switch, which is why the four producers’ file became the first brake, and why a consensus edit is the only way to move the gas token without the attacker’s key.
Would Polygon Do This for a Regular Holder?
Once a chain has rewritten native balances for Binance and Polymarket, the next drained wallet has a template to point at. The objection that followed the proposal was not mainly a lecture about immutability. It was a fairness test: if Polygon will open the ledger for two brand names, does a regular POL holder get the same irregular state change when a phishing site empties an account?
The PIP’s own fence is the list of conditions. A future request is supposed to fail unless the theft is publicly acknowledged, every producer has blocked the addresses, the sum is large enough to justify a fork, the funds trace to a known reputable victim, that victim presents the PIP, and nobody else has a live claim. A random holder will struggle to meet that bar. Two listed companies that already paid users, and that can walk into a protocol call with recovery addresses ready, will not.
That is the precedent the authors say they are not creating, and the one the vote still creates in practice. Validators are not being asked to run a claims court. They are being asked to bless one closed list. The next list will arrive with the same sentence about extreme cases.
Four elected block producers also sit in a place Ethereum’s validator set does not. They could freeze the coins in the first place. A chain with that choke point can act in days. It can also be lobbied, which is why the cash offer to validators belongs in the same file as the recovery vote.
Two Weeks to Amoy, Then a Named Block
Approval on November 5 started engineering, not the fork. The rollout in the PIP is short and still undated at the back end.
THE PATH TO BLOCK F
- October 29, 2026: Polymarket’s vendor script drains users; Binance hot wallets are hit from about 20:05 UTC, including the POL and USDT send on Polygon.
- October 30, 2026: Producers extend the Bor block list; Binance asks for the 0x5227 address to be covered; Tether freezes the USDT; a 219,450 POL fee lands in the mempool.
- November 4, 2026: The recovery PIP is posted, with fork name and activation block left open.
- November 5, 2026: PPGC 47 hears the proposal at 14:30 UTC and approves it; Foundation says planning moves inside.
After that, Bor engineers still have to confirm the transition, ship a client, and rehearse on Amoy with test accounts standing in for the five wallets and the two recovery addresses. About two weeks after approval is the window the PIP calls workable; one week is tight. Polygon validator operations expects about 70 to 80% of stake to reach the required version quickly after release. Before mainnet, validators, RPC providers and explorers get notice. At block F the balances move. After F, the authors want a published, transaction-free record of the change and a verification script, because explorers and indexers that rebuild balances from transactions alone will otherwise miss it.
Nodes that do not upgrade follow a different chain from block F. That is the split risk, written in plain language in the compatibility section. The 2016 version of that sentence produced Ethereum Classic. Polygon is smaller, the sum is smaller, and the coins are already frozen, which makes a stubborn minority less likely. It does not make the client optional.
Until the activation block is published, 70.49 million POL remains in five wallets that cannot spend it and cannot give it back. The November 5 vote said the chain will end that standoff by editing the ledger. The edit itself has not run.
Disclaimer: This article is news reporting and analysis of a proposed Polygon PoS protocol change and related security incidents. It is for information only and is not investment, trading, legal or tax advice, and it is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold POL or any other token. Readers should consult a qualified financial adviser, lawyer or tax professional licensed for their jurisdiction before making decisions about crypto assets or about running validator or node software. Token prices, blocked balances, recovery amounts and the status of the hard fork reflect the cited company statements and forum proposal as published on the dates named above and can change as governance, client releases and on-chain balances move.
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