NEWS
The $6.45 Million Safe Drain Did Not Need a Signature
A $6.45 million Safe drain went through a Zodiac Roles key with no owner signature, after a custom policy allowed the spend.
A Safe multisig on Ethereum lost $6.45 million on November 16 after a Zodiac Roles key moved the treasury with no owner signature. Blockchain security firm PeckShield, citing on-chain analyst Specter, posted a $6.45 million drain alert that afternoon, and the product is still widely called a Gnosis Safe wallet even as the company styles it Safe.
The spend did not wait for the owners. It ran through a third-party Roles module they had already turned on, a side door that lets one key act inside a written policy.
$6.45 Million Left Without an Owner Vote
Ethereum records put the call at 11:35 UTC on November 16, in block 26,427,327. In one step the wallet pulled 4.39 million USDC out of a Morpho lending vault and sent it, with 1.72 million syrupUSDC, to a single receiving address. syrupUSDC is the yield-bearing dollar token from Maple Finance, so each unit is worth more than a dollar and the token counts are not a dollar sum. PeckShield’s public total for the job was $6.45 million.
The function on the module was execTransactionWithRole. The Safe proxy that lost the funds sits at 0x5953…80de. The first hop landed at 0x2b02…b9e1. Specter tied the path to permissions already sitting in the wallet’s Zodiac Roles module, which is built so a named member can execute without collecting owner signatures on that call.
THE DRAIN ON CHAIN
| Item | Figure | What it is |
|---|---|---|
| USDC | 4.39 million | Tokens pulled from a Morpho vault |
| syrupUSDC | 1.72 million | Maple Finance yield tokens, not $1 units |
| PeckShield total | $6.45 million | Dollar estimate on the same transfer |
| Hyperliquid XMR | about $813,000 | Later spend PeckShield tied to the thief |
| Wagyu to Monero | about $1.2 million | Later hop Specter tracked off the Safe |
Those last two rows are pieces of the same $6.45 million after it left, not a second loss on top. Nobody has published a recovery, a Circle freeze, or a name for the treasury that held the Safe.
NOVEMBER 16 ON THE CLOCK
- 11:35 UTC: The Roles call moves 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC off the Safe.
- 14:46 UTC: PeckShield posts Specter’s finding and the $6.45 million figure, plus about $813,000 already spent on Hyperliquid toward XMR.
- 16:07 UTC: Zodiac says it found no contract bug and points at a probably stolen role-member key plus a custom policy.
- 17:02 UTC: Rahul Rumalla, chief executive of Safe Labs, says the incident is not related to Safe and that the module sat outside Safe{Wallet}.
- 17:26 UTC: The @safe account says one multisig was hit, no owner signed, and Safe smart contracts and Safe{Wallet} are unaffected.
On November 17, Safe Labs repeated that line to users who were still treating the drain as a break in the Safe contracts. The money had been gone for more than 18 hours by then.
What the Zodiac Roles Module Allows
A Safe is a smart account that normally moves funds only when enough owners sign. Teams still have bills to pay, vaults to tend, and bots that need to act while signers are offline, which is the gap Zodiac fills. Its docs say the Roles Modifier gives addresses limited power over a Safe, with each role listing the exact calls members may make, and the contract checking every call onchain and reverting the rest.
Typical setups in those docs include a DAO handing a vendor a slice of the treasury under strict rules, a team funding daily operations with per-token caps, and a bot or an AI agent trading only on approved venues. The list of production users includes Safe, ENS DAO, Balancer, Gnosis DAO, Gnosis Pay, and kpk. Members then execute inside the policy with no extra signer round on that transaction, and every action stays visible onchain.
HOW A ROLE GETS THE KEYS
- Author: Owners write the permissions in the Zodiac App or as code, naming members, targets, functions, and any caps.
- Apply: The Safe that owns the module signs those configuration calls, so the policy itself still needs the real threshold.
- Execute: A role member sends a call through the module, which checks the policy and, if it matches, forwards it to the Safe.
That third step is the whole point, and it is also the hole. Zodiac’s security page is blunt about it: a module is a path into the Safe without signatures. Owners pick which modules exist and which mastercopy each proxy runs. Role conditions inspect the call data, not prices, balances, or slippage. The written rule is to design permissions so that a fully stolen member key can only cause losses the owners will accept, and to put a Delay Modifier in front of anything that can cause more.
Monday’s policy, in Zodiac’s own account, allowed a transfer the owners almost certainly never meant to bless. The contracts did not go rogue. They enforced a rule that was wide enough for one key to empty the wallet.
Safe Pins the Drain on One Multisig and a Stolen Key
Zodiac’s first public note landed about four and a half hours after the transfer, and it refused the bug story that was already spreading under the Gnosis Safe name.
We were informed of a potential theft from a Safe using the Zodiac Roles Modifier. We found no contract vulnerability. A role member key, probably compromised, sent a transaction that a custom policy allowed but likely never intended.
Zodiac, official account, on X
We were informed of a potential theft from a Safe using the Zodiac Roles Modifier.
We found no contract vulnerability. A role member key, probably compromised, sent a transaction that a custom policy allowed but likely never intended.
— Zodiac (@zodiaceco) November 16, 2026
Johannes Moormann, a Zodiac co-founder, later said his team reviewed the call, confirmed it passed the Roles Modifier’s check against the wallet’s own policy, and allowed it. He said there is no vulnerability in the module, the contracts worked correctly, and the transaction came from the key of a long-standing role member that was most likely stolen. The keys and the permissions belonged to the wallet’s operators, he said, and Zodiac had no access to them, no hand in the setup, and no contact with the affected team. He did not treat the episode as a flaw in other wallets that run the module.
Safe’s brand account answered on the same thread and kept the blast radius to one wallet.
This affected one multisig. Safe smart contracts and Safe{Wallet} are unaffected. A role member’s key, likely compromised, sent the transaction through a third-party Zodiac Roles module installed outside Safe{Wallet}. No owner signed it.
Safe.eth, official account, on X
This affected one multisig. Safe smart contracts and Safe{Wallet} are unaffected.
A role member's key, likely compromised, sent the transaction through a third-party Zodiac Roles module installed outside Safe{Wallet}. No owner signed it. @zodiaceco found no contract…
— Safe.eth (@safe) November 16, 2026
Rumalla, posting as chief executive of Safe Labs, called it a potentially stolen key or signing setup behind a roles policy on a third-party module installed outside Safe{Wallet}. Replies under PeckShield’s alert still treated a drained Safe as a broken Safe. One of those replies even reached for blind-signing by owners, which is a real failure mode in other thefts and the wrong one here, because no owner signed this transfer at all. The mix-up is doing some of the thief’s work: if the public files every empty Safe under “the contracts failed,” treasuries keep leaving the same side door on.
Gnosis Pay’s $1.5 Million Bill From June
Roles has failed in public before, and that failure was a code bug, which is why Monday’s wording from Zodiac matters. On June 1, 2026, attackers used an ERC-1271 signature check in Roles Modifier v2.1.0 and Delay Modifier v1.1.0 that accepted a magic return value without checking that the underlying call had succeeded. Gnosis said the attackers extracted a total of $1.5m from card safes that used those modules, with about $300,000 left in accounts that could not be opened, and that Gnosis absorbed the losses and restored users.
Gnosis Guild’s ERC-1271 authorization bypass post-mortem narrowed the blast. The bug was exploitable only when a Safe using the CompatibilityFallbackHandler was assigned as a role member or as a Delay module. Setups whose role members were ordinary keys were never at risk. Confirmed loss outside Gnosis Pay was about $4,500. Patched mastercopies, Roles 2.1.1 and Delay 1.1.1, shipped on June 19 after a Gnosis audit, and the old 2.1.0 copy remains on the do-not-use list.
TWO ROLES FAILURES, FIVE MONTHS APART
| June 1, 2026 | November 16, 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| What broke | Auth bug in Roles 2.1.0 and Delay 1.1.0 | Likely stolen role key plus a wide custom policy |
| Safe contracts | Not broken | Not broken |
| Who was hit | Gnosis Pay card safes, plus a small tail of other accounts | One unnamed Safe |
| Money | $1.5 million taken, users made whole | $6.45 million, no repayment announced |
| Fix | Roles 2.1.1 and Delay 1.1.1 | No contract patch; policy and key problem |
Monday’s drain does not reopen that June hole. It lands on the sentence Zodiac already prints for operators: treat a member key as if it were already public, and size the policy so that the worst day is a loss you chose.
Why the Stolen Dollars Went Into Monero
USDC is the part of a haul that can still be stopped. Circle can blacklist an address and freeze tokens sitting there, which is why a thief who has just emptied a dollar book wants those dollars gone before anyone picks up the phone. PeckShield said about $813,000 of this pile had already been spent on Hyperliquid toward XMR. Specter separately tracked about $1.2 million through Wagyu, a service he identified by name, into Monero.
The same Monday, a separate drain hit market makers on Lighter, a decentralized derivatives venue, for $10 million to $15.5 million after a leaked API key. That thief also bridged more than $1.1 million to Hyperliquid to buy XMR, and Lighter halted withdrawals once it confirmed the leak. Two desks, two failure modes, one off-ramp: a venue that will sell a Monero-named token against dollars that Circle can no longer touch.
Module calls are easy to miss if a treasury only watches owner proposals. A Roles execution does not look like a Safe vote, so the first public flag on this wallet arrived more than three hours after the tokens had moved, when PeckShield relayed Specter. By then the first hops toward Monero were already in motion. Hyperliquid now sits in the same sentence as two same-day thefts, which is the sort of pattern that draws a regulator even when the venue did not write the stolen policy.
An Unnamed Treasury and a Side Door Still Open
Nobody has publicly named the owners of 0x5953…80de. Maple issued the syrupUSDC. Morpho hosted the USDC vault. Neither has been identified as the victim, and neither Safe nor Zodiac has said it is in contact with the team that configured the role. Moormann said Zodiac had not spoken with them. No reimbursement fund has been announced, which is the other difference from June, when Gnosis made Pay users whole.
WHAT WE KNOW
- The route: One Safe, one Roles call, no owner signature, $6.45 million by PeckShield’s count.
- The code: Safe and Zodiac both say the smart contracts and Safe{Wallet} were not hit.
- The key: A long-standing role member, most likely stolen, spent inside a custom policy that allowed the transfer.
- The cash: 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC left first, with later hops of about $813,000 on Hyperliquid and about $1.2 million through Wagyu toward Monero.
WHAT IS UNCONFIRMED
- The victim: No person, fund, or DAO has claimed the emptied Safe.
- The leak: How the role key left its holder is not public.
- The freeze: No named Circle blacklist of the receiving addresses has been shown.
- The rest of the pile: How much still sits in USDC, ether, or Hyperliquid accounts is not a settled public figure.
On November 17, Safe Labs was still telling users the contracts were untouched. The unnamed treasury has not come forward, and disabling the module, when someone finally does it, will need the same owner threshold the thief never had to meet.
Frequently Asked Questions
Was the Safe Contract Hacked in the $6.45 Million Drain?
No. Safe’s brand account and Safe Labs both said the smart contracts and the Safe{Wallet} app were unaffected, and that the Roles module had been installed outside Safe{Wallet}. Moormann said the incident does not point to a flaw in other wallets that use the module, so a drain of one mis-permissioned Safe is not a reason to treat every Safe as broken.
What Does the Zodiac Roles Module Do on a Safe?
It is an onchain permissions layer. Owners define roles, members, allowed targets, and optional caps or conditions, then the module forwards matching calls to the Safe and reverts the rest. Current production Roles is v2, with mastercopy 2.1.1 at 0xF2964CE6161ce0e75964Fe7927cE114cb0B283D5; v3 is in development with no deployments yet, and the old 2.1.0 copy is on Zodiac’s do-not-use list.
Is This the Same Failure as the June Gnosis Pay Exploit?
No. The June 1 bug needed a Safe with the CompatibilityFallbackHandler assigned as a role member or Delay module, and ordinary key members were never exposed. Monday’s transfer, per Zodiac, came from a long-standing role member key that was most likely stolen and from a custom policy that allowed a spend it likely never intended, which is a configuration failure on a live module, not that signature-check bug.
Why Did the Attacker Move the Money Into Monero?
Circle can freeze USDC at a flagged address and cannot freeze ether or Monero, so a fast swap into XMR and into a Monero-named token on Hyperliquid cuts the issuer out of the chase. Specter also flagged Wagyu as the service on the about $1.2 million Monero hop, a rail other desks used the same day after the separate Lighter API-key drain.
Disclaimer: This article is news reporting on a digital-asset theft and on the wallet software and modules named in public statements. It is for information only and is not investment advice, legal advice, or a security review of any wallet, key, or policy. Readers who hold funds in a Safe, run a Zodiac Roles module, or are deciding whether to move or freeze assets should consult a qualified security engineer and, where money is at stake, legal counsel before they change signers, permissions, or custody. Dollar figures, token counts, and status details reflect the onchain records and named statements cited here and can change if more hops, freezes, or owner notices appear.
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