Iraq and Jordan agreed in Washington on Wednesday to push forward a Red Sea oil pipeline first floated in 1983, a day before a drone struck a tanker near Basra and Brent crude climbed toward $84 a barrel. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi met on the sidelines of Iraq’s state visit to the United States, with Tom Barrack, the US special envoy to Iraq and Syria, and the US ambassador to Turkey in the room.
It is the same 1,600-kilometer route the two governments have signed, budgeted, delayed and shelved for more than a decade. Only one stretch of it has actually broken ground, and the segment that would carry Iraqi crude across the border into Jordan is still, for now, just talk.
A Wednesday Meeting Revives an Old Plan
Jordanian state television reported that Safadi and al-Zaidi discussed “moving forward” with the Basra-Aqaba project. Participants, it said, discussed opportunities for trilateral co-operation in several areas of mutual economic interest.
The Washington sit-down built on an earlier Baghdad meeting this month, when al-Zaidi hosted a Jordanian trade delegation to align protocols on the same project. Safadi also delivered an invitation from Jordan’s King Abdullah II for al-Zaidi to make a formal state visit to Amman.
The timing is not subtle. Iran effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz after the US and Israel opened an air war on February 28, and tanker traffic through the waterway collapsed to as few as two ships a day at the war’s worst point, according to maritime tracking data cited by Al Jazeera. Traffic has since recovered unevenly, with fewer than 45 verified crossings on some recent days, far below the 120 to 140 vessels a day that passed through before the fighting began.
The renewed urgency showed up again on Thursday. A drone hit a tanker near Basra, though officials said loading operations there continued. Dana Gas, the UAE-based energy company, separately shut down production at Iraq’s Khor Mor gas field, citing credible security threats. The collapse of the US-Iran ceasefire and Iran’s move to close the strait again have only sharpened the argument for routes that avoid it entirely.
The Same Pipeline Has Returned Five Times Since 1983
Saddam Hussein’s government first studied a line from Basra to Aqaba in 1983, after the Iran-Iraq War turned the Gulf into open water for missile strikes on tankers. It never left the drawing board. Since then, the project has been announced, funded on paper and quietly dropped on a rhythm tied almost exactly to the region’s crises.
Hormuz has been the world’s most documented energy chokepoint for decades, and its risks were mapped, modeled, and priced into infrastructure decisions across the region.
Maisoon Kafafy, senior adviser to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, told CNBC that the deterrent logic around the strait made a full closure seem too costly for any actor to try, until it happened anyway.
The pipeline’s own record backs that up.
- 1983: Baghdad’s planners sketch a Basra-to-Aqaba route to escape the Gulf entirely, then shelve it as war spending consumes the budget.
- 2013: Iraq and Jordan sign a formal agreement to build the line through Jordan’s Zarqa refinery, priced at roughly $18 billion.
- 2014: Islamic State fighters seize much of Anbar province, physically cutting the route and scaring off bidders.
- 2017: The twin gas-and-oil version is scrapped over cost, and the crude-only project is downgraded before being cancelled outright.
- 2019 to 2020: Iraq’s cabinet approves a new framework, sets a bidding deadline, then postpones it as Covid-19 shuts down travel and financing talks.
- 2022: The cabinet approves the framework agreement a third time, and a powerful Iran-aligned militia leader publicly vows to block it.
- 2025 to 2026: Iraq lines up Chinese financing for the domestic Basra-Haditha stretch and fast-tracks bidding, while the Jordan-facing leg returns to the table in Washington.
Each cycle has followed the same shape. A crisis makes the case for the pipeline undeniable, officials meet and announce progress, and then security, financing or Baghdad’s internal politics stall it again before pipe goes into the ground.
One Segment Is Finally Moving Dirt
What is different this time is that part of the project is no longer hypothetical. Iraq’s cabinet approved the domestic Basra-Haditha segment, budgeted at 5.97 trillion dinars (about $4.56 billion) and partly financed through Iraq’s framework agreement with China. It is designed to carry 2.25 million barrels a day and is meant to be finished within roughly two years of construction starting.
Iraq’s oil ministry has since authorized its own agency to bypass the normal bidding process and invite specialist contractors directly, a move meant to speed up a project that has missed every previous deadline. Lawmakers from Anbar province, where the pipeline route runs, have pushed for the Haditha-to-Aqaba extension specifically to be prioritized next.
That extension is the part still stuck in the diplomatic phase. The proposed leg from Haditha to Aqaba would carry 1 million barrels a day, bringing total corridor capacity to 3.25 million barrels once both phases are built, close to the roughly 3.3 million barrels a day Iraq was exporting from Basra’s terminals before the war. It has no construction timeline, no confirmed contractor and no financing plan beyond the cabinet’s repeated endorsements.
Iraq Is Bleeding $270 Million a Day
The financial pressure behind this week’s meeting is not abstract. Iraq’s southern oil fields, which normally do the heavy lifting for the national budget, have been running far below capacity since the war began.
- $260 million to $280 million in daily revenue Iraq is estimated to be losing while the strait remains contested and storage tanks stay full.
- 70 percent drop in exports from Iraq’s main southern oil fields during the Iran conflict, compared with pre-war levels.
- 90 percent of Iraq’s federal budget that depends on oil revenue, leaving Baghdad with little room to absorb a prolonged shutdown.
- $84 the price of a barrel of Brent crude on Thursday, up from $76 before the latest round of strait escalation.
Iraq’s finances were already under strain from a separate fight with OPEC over how much oil Baghdad is allowed to pump, a dispute that predates the Hormuz crisis but compounds it. Storage constraints, not physical damage to the fields, forced Baghdad to cut production at its largest fields, Rumaila and West Qurna 2, because the tanks simply had nowhere left to put unsold crude.
Why Do Iran-Backed Factions Oppose the Aqaba Route?
Iran-aligned Shiite political factions have blocked or delayed the pipeline at nearly every stage since 2017, arguing it could indirectly benefit Israel because of Aqaba’s proximity to Israeli territory and shipping. That objection, more than cost or security alone, is why the Jordan-facing leg has never advanced as far as its domestic counterpart.
Qais Khazali, leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, said in 2022 he refused “to extend the pipeline to feed Israel.” The claim persists despite Iraqi officials insisting the oil would go to Jordan and Egypt, not Israel.
- Security in Anbar province, where US airstrikes have targeted Iran-backed militia positions along the pipeline’s planned route.
- Suspicion among Iran-aligned factions that Aqaba’s location could indirectly serve Israeli interests.
- Economics: moving oil overland to the Red Sea costs more than exporting it through Iraq’s existing Gulf terminals in calmer times.
- Opacity over which foreign companies would ultimately build, own and profit from the finished line.
Kamaran Qadir, a Kurdish university professor, told The New Arab the project “has more of a political dimension than an economic one,” since shipping oil through the Gulf remains cheaper than routing it to Aqaba. He also dismissed the Israel claims directly, noting Israel already sources its oil from Cyprus, Norway and Canada.
How Basra-Aqaba Stacks Up Against Rival Bypass Routes
Iraq is not the only Gulf producer racing to build around Hormuz. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have pipelines moving oil to open water, and the gap between what exists and what Hormuz normally carries is enormous.
| Route | Path | Capacity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline) | Abqaiq to Yanbu, Red Sea | Up to 7 million bpd design; roughly 4 million bpd in use | Running near capacity; hit by an Iranian strike in April that cut flows by 700,000 bpd |
| UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah line (ADCOP) | Habshan to Fujairah, Gulf of Oman | 1.5 to 1.8 million bpd, doubling to 3.6 million planned | Operating; Fujairah’s terminal has faced drone attacks |
| Iraq’s Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline | Kirkuk, Iraq to Ceyhan, Turkey | About 1.6 million bpd design; running near 200,000 to 250,000 bpd | Restarted in March after a prior shutdown |
| Basra-Aqaba (Haditha-Aqaba leg) | Haditha, Iraq to Aqaba, Jordan | 1 million bpd planned | Still under discussion; no construction start date |
Even added together, the region’s bypass pipelines fall well short of what the strait can move on a normal day. The 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels a day of spare bypass capacity identified by the International Energy Agency compares with roughly 20 million barrels a day that historically passed through Hormuz.
Pipelines Draw the Same Fire as Tankers
Building around the strait does not remove the risk Iran poses, it just relocates it. Iran struck a pumping station on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline in April, slashing its throughput by 700,000 barrels a day. Drone strikes have separately disrupted loading at Fujairah, the UAE’s main bypass terminal.
“The problem isn’t the waterway,” Bob McNally, founder of Rapidan Energy Group, told CNBC’s Power Lunch. “It’s that Iran can use weapons to attack loading facilities, pumping stations, the end stations, these terminals, and the storage units of these pipelines.”
Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward, said Iran’s sporadic strikes on tankers using the US-patrolled southern corridor are meant to punish Gulf producers who avoid the northern route Tehran controls. Jennifer Li, a geopolitical analyst at the energy consulting firm Rystad, put it plainly to CNBC: the new pipelines work as a hedge against a Hormuz shock, not as a genuine substitute for the strait itself. Recent attacks have also increasingly targeted supertankers rather than smaller vessels, complicating efforts to keep any single route consistently open.
Goldman Sachs estimates that pipelines already under construction, including Iraq’s Basra-Haditha segment and the UAE’s expansion, could shield 45 percent of pre-war Gulf export volume by the end of this year, rising past 60 percent by the end of 2028. Getting the Aqaba leg into that math still depends on the same Baghdad politics that have stopped it four times already.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Basra-Aqaba pipeline?
It is a proposed two-phase oil pipeline running from Iraq’s Rumaila oilfield near Basra to the western Iraqi city of Haditha, then on to Jordan’s only port at Aqaba on the Red Sea. The idea dates to 1983 and has been signed, funded and shelved multiple times since.
How much oil could the pipeline actually carry?
The Iraqi domestic segment to Haditha is designed for 2.25 million barrels a day. The Jordan-facing extension would add 1 million barrels a day, bringing the full corridor to 3.25 million barrels a day if both phases are ever completed.
Why does Jordan want this pipeline so badly?
Earlier versions of the project envisioned Jordan drawing about 150,000 barrels a day from the line to supply its Zarqa refinery at a discount, alongside transit fees and energy security benefits the kingdom has sought for over a decade.
Has any part of the pipeline actually been built?
Not yet in Jordan. Iraq’s cabinet has approved and budgeted the domestic Basra-Haditha stretch, financed partly through a framework agreement with China, and authorized direct contractor bids to speed construction. The cross-border leg to Aqaba remains in the discussion stage.
Why do some Iraqi political factions oppose it?
Iran-aligned Shiite factions, including the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, have argued since at least 2017 that oil reaching Aqaba could indirectly benefit Israel given the port’s proximity to Israeli territory, a claim Iraqi officials and some independent analysts dispute.
Could the pipeline realistically be finished this time?
Iraq’s oil ministry has targeted roughly two years for the domestic Basra-Haditha segment once construction is fully underway. No comparable timeline exists yet for the Jordan-facing leg, which still needs financing, a contractor and resolution of the political objections that have stalled it before.
