US Is Quietly Testing Israel as Its Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier

The United States is weighing whether to relocate some of its military bases in the Gulf to Israel after Iranian strikes left hundreds of millions of dollars in damage across its regional footprint, the Wall Street Journal reported on June 25. The reported review is the most concrete step yet toward operationalising a decades-old talking point on both sides of the Atlantic: that Israel, with its runways, hangars, missile batteries, and technicians, already functions as an unsinkable American aircraft carrier in the eastern Mediterranean.

Middle East Eye, summarising the report, said the US is considering moving some of its Gulf bases to Israel after they were attacked by Iran earlier this year. The Wall Street Journal cited two US officials saying the Pentagon is studying whether to rebuild its naval base in Bahrain, reduce its presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and shift some operations westward to Israeli soil. The Pentagon has not publicly acknowledged the extent of the damage in Bahrain.

Why the Iran War Is Forcing a US Basing Review

The war that broke out on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran, ended with a Pakistan-mediated ceasefire on April 8 and a 14-point Islamabad Memorandum signed by Donald Trump at the Palace of Versailles on June 17. Between those two dates, Iran retaliated against US military installations across the Gulf, leaving the American regional posture looking more exposed than at any point since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis reviewed by the BBC, Iranian strikes caused about $800m in damage to US bases in the first two weeks, including roughly $310m in damage to buildings, facilities and other infrastructure. The single most expensive item was a US AN/TPY-2 radar, which CSIS estimates cost about $485m, knocked out at a base in Jordan. Pentagon officials told members of Congress that the first six days of the war cost $11.3bn and the first twelve days $16.5bn, again according to CSIS.

The damage did not stop after the ceasefire. The 1lurer.am outlet, citing the Wall Street Journal, reported that the US Navy base in Bahrain was “repeatedly targeted between late February and June,” with the command headquarters and at least a dozen other buildings “especially hit hard,” citing serving and former US service members, analyses of satellite imagery and social-media footage. The Pentagon has not acknowledged the extent of the destruction.

From Carrier Metaphor to Runway in Israel

The basing review lands at a moment when Israel already hosts more US military hardware than at any time in the two countries’ alliance history. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies reported in February 2026 that the United States had deployed up to 12 F-22 Raptor stealth fighters to Israel’s southern Ovda Air Base, the first time US combat aircraft had been positioned in Israel for an anticipated combat operation. JINSA, the Washington-based think tank, called the deployment a historic expansion of US-Israeli military cooperation.

Deploying F-22s to Ovda now gives the United States a third aircraft carrier in the region to confront Iran.

JINSA made the case on its programme page on the first ever deployment of U.S. combat aircraft to Israel. The same outlet argued the deployment gave Washington “far more striking power than our entire buildup at other airbases throughout the region.” Wikipedia’s tracking of the 2026 US military buildup in the Middle East puts the wider picture in one line: F-22s to Israel, F-15E Strike Eagles to Jordan, and large numbers of tanker aircraft, with three US carrier strike groups operating in the region by late April 2026.

What changed in the last six months was less the equipment and more the legal and political ground under it. Until February 2026, the United States had no formal permanent base in Israel, and no history of deploying combat aircraft to Israeli runways for joint operations. The closest precedent was a single air-defence battery inside the Israeli Air Force’s Mashabim Air Base in the Negev, opened on September 18, 2017, and explicitly described by the Israeli Air Force at the time as “the first ever” US permanent base on Israeli soil.

What’s Already on Israeli Soil Today

The inventory on Israeli runways and rooftops now stretches far beyond Mashabim. According to Wikipedia’s military-buildup tracker, twelve F-22 Raptors landed at Ovda in late February 2026, the same week the total number of US Air Force refueling tankers deployed at Ben Gurion International Airport rose to 14 to give the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier air wing enough range to reach Iran. Forbes reported separately that the heavy US tanker footprint at Ben Gurion has prompted Israeli complaints about the squeeze on civil aviation.

Israel’s own air defences sit alongside the American ones. After Iran’s direct ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1, 2024, Washington deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery along with at least 100 troops. A second THAAD was transferred in early 2025 ahead of the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. Those two batteries, plus the Mashabim air-defence site, plus the F-22 squadron at Ovda and the tanker fleet at Ben Gurion, are the shape of the basing review’s starting position.

What It Cost the US to Defend Israel by Interceptor

The case for siting more US forces in Israel rests partly on the cost of doing the same job from the Gulf, and partly on what Israel already buys the US in missile defence. A Washington Post report cited in Forbes found that the United States fired roughly twice as many missile interceptors to shield Israel from incoming Iranian ballistic missiles as Israel itself did during the 2026 war. The headline number is striking: the U.S. fired approximately 200 THAAD interceptors during the war, roughly half its entire arsenal. Lockheed Martin was producing about 20 of those interceptors a year.

The full inventory published by Forbes is sharper still. Each THAAD interceptor costs an estimated $12m to $15m; SM-3 naval interceptors cost between $9.66m and $27.9m depending on variant; SM-6s about $9.5m. Israel fired fewer than 100 Arrow interceptors in the same war, each priced at an estimated $2m to $3m, plus roughly 90 of its David’s Sling Stunner missiles, which are substantially cheaper than the American Patriot PAC-3.

CSIS estimates, again as reported by Forbes, that it will take the United States about two years to replenish its SM-3 and SM-6 stocks and at least three years to restore the THAAD arsenal to pre-war levels, assuming no fresh fighting. A US official cited by the Washington Post warned that any new round could see the US firing even more interceptors to defend Israel, since some Israeli missile-defence systems are presently undergoing maintenance.

The Benefits and Burdens for Both Sides

Israel comes out the obvious beneficiary of the redirected basing. THAAD batteries intercept Iranian ballistic missiles that would otherwise eat into Israel’s limited stockpile of Arrow interceptors. The permanent Mashabim air-defence site adds another sensor-and-shooter layer to a country whose Home Front Command now assesses that Iranian ballistic missiles could pose an even greater threat in the next war than in any of the preceding ones. KC-46 and KC-135 tankers at Ben Gurion give Israeli fighters, F-35I Adirs included, more range into Iranian airspace. And on May 27 Israel took delivery of its first Boeing KC-46 tanker, called “Gideon” in Israeli Air Force service, with at least six more expected.

The burdens on Israel are smaller but visible. The tanker fleet at Ben Gurion has prompted complaints about lost civil-aviation slots. Hosting a US squadron at Ovda, and potentially more US hardware at other Israeli bases, gives Tehran an obvious list of new targets on Israeli soil. And Israeli decision-makers cannot easily decouple themselves from Washington’s escalation decisions when American troops and aircraft sit on their runways.

The US side of the ledger is more contested. The Pentagon has not publicly released damage assessments for Bahrain, and the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, summarising leaked Pentagon documents, framed the leaks themselves as a deliberate signal: “There is no easy way to resume fighting Iran without risking American troops, strategic interests and critical military resources.” At home, a Quinnipiac University poll found that 60 percent of American voters think US military action against Iran was “not worth it,” and 61 percent believe Iran is still likely to develop nuclear weapons. Relocating Gulf forces to Israel also gives Washington bases less exposed to Iranian missiles and free of the political restrictions some Gulf Arab partners have placed on US use of their airspace, restrictions that played a direct role in the original decision to send F-22s to Ovda.

The Last Time the Metaphor Was Tested

The phrase is older than any current basing decision. On July 3, 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walked the flight deck of the USS George H.W. Bush while the Nimitz-class carrier was anchored off Haifa after five months of operations against the Islamic State, and made the case to reporters in a single line.

We are here on a mighty aircraft carrier of the United States and a few miles from here, there is another mighty aircraft carrier of our common civilization. It’s called the State of Israel.

Netanyahu’s host, US Navy Captain William Pennington, told Defense News that the two militaries were “very tightly linked” and pointed to “a tremendous network of shared intelligence.” Less than three months later, on September 18, 2017, the United States opened the United States established an official, permanent military base in Israel for the first time, an air-defence site inside the Israeli Air Force’s Mashabim Air Base in the Negev. The Israeli brigadier general who announced it, Tzvika Haimovitch, called the moment “nothing short of historic.”

From that single Mashabim ribbon-cutting in 2017 to twelve F-22s at Ovda in February 2026, the carrier metaphor has been tested one step at a time. The Wall Street Journal’s June 25 report is the first time Washington has been reported as weighing the move openly, in print, with officials on the record. The decision is not made. The runways, hangars, and batteries are already there.

Frequently Asked Questions

Where exactly is the US considering relocating bases from?

The Wall Street Journal reported on June 25 that Washington is studying whether to rebuild its naval base in Bahrain, which the WSJ says suffered extensive damage including to command headquarters and at least a dozen other buildings, while reducing its presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and shifting some operations to Israel. The Pentagon has not publicly acknowledged the Bahrain damage assessment.

What US military equipment is already in Israel?

Twelve F-22 Raptor stealth fighters are at Ovda Air Base since late February 2026, the first-ever deployment of US combat aircraft to Israel. Fourteen US Air Force refueling tankers, KC-46s and KC-135s, were at Ben Gurion Airport by late February. Two THAAD missile-defence batteries have been deployed since 2024 with at least 100 US troops, and the United States has operated a permanent air-defence base inside the Israeli Air Force’s Mashabim Air Base in the Negev since September 2017.

How much did the 2026 Iran war cost the US military?

CSIS estimated the first six days of the war cost $11.3bn and the first twelve days $16.5bn. The BBC, citing CSIS and its own satellite analysis, put damage to US bases in the first two weeks at about $800m, including a single AN/TPY-2 radar valued at about $485m. The United States fired roughly 200 THAAD interceptors during the war, about half its stockpile, plus more than 100 SM-3 and SM-6 naval interceptors.

Is there an active ceasefire between the US and Iran?

A Pakistan-mediated ceasefire took effect on April 8, 2026. On June 14, the two governments announced the 14-point Islamabad Memorandum to end the war and unblock the Strait of Hormuz; Trump signed it at the Palace of Versailles on June 17. Clashes resumed in late June, but on June 28 the US and Iran agreed to halt their exchange of attacks.