Sudan’s foreign minister and its army chief of staff held parallel high-level talks in Riyadh and Ankara on Monday, signing a new coordination council with Saudi Arabia while deepening military contacts with Turkey. The moves landed as the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance advanced into operational activation along the Red Sea.
Foreign Minister Mohieldin Salem Ahmed Ibrahim co-chaired political consultations with Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan and oversaw creation of the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council. At the same time, Sudanese Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasir Abdelrahman Hassan Elatta met Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and Chief of General Staff Selcuk Bayraktaroglu in Ankara.
Riyadh puts cooperation on institutional footing
Saudi and Sudanese foreign ministers signed the document establishing the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council in Riyadh. The Saudi Press Agency said the body is meant to serve as an effective platform for developing bilateral relations and a framework that brings relevant entities together to deliver clear initiatives, projects and objectives.
The two ministers also co-chaired a session of the bilateral Political Consultation and Follow-Up Committee. They reviewed relations, discussed expanding cooperation across multiple fields and exchanged views on regional developments.
Speaking afterward, Salem described the ties as strategic and said he expected the council to produce tangible results. He called Red Sea security a top priority for both countries and praised the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement linking Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. He expressed optimism that Sudan could eventually join a broader grouping with the Kingdom.
- Political and security coordination under a standing institutional umbrella
- Economic and social projects with defined targets
- Integration of humanitarian channels already active through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center
- Follow-up mechanisms that convert summit language into joint workstreams
Salem credited Riyadh with hosting the early Jeddah talks after the war began in April 2023 and said the conflict had forced Sudan to reassess its external relationships. Saudi foreign ministry photos of the Riyadh signing showed the formal ceremony with both ministers and supporting officials present.
Ankara keeps the military channel open
Elatta arrived as the official guest of Turkey’s chief of general staff. The Turkish Defense Ministry confirmed meetings with Guler and Bayraktaroglu but released few operational details. The visit continues a steady run of contacts: Salem met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on July 28 and signed a memorandum on diplomatic academy cooperation. Sovereignty Council chief and SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on June 2.
Erdogan used a fresh Al Jazeera interview released Monday to restate personal backing. According to a Turkish presidency transcript, he said of Burhan: “I genuinely see Sudan’s leader as a leader worthy of Sudan at this stage.” He added that relations remain very good and described Sudan’s administration as moderate.
I genuinely see Sudan’s leader as a leader worthy of Sudan at this stage.
Erdogan made the remark while discussing the Mecca defense framework and wider regional turbulence. Turkish accounts covering the Elatta reception framed the stop as a signal of higher-level armed-forces cooperation rather than pure protocol.
The 14-nation Red Sea frame around both visits
Both the Riyadh council and the Ankara staff talks sit inside a larger Saudi-led maritime project. In late July Riyadh hosted an international meeting and unveiled plans for a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance focused on the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. A Saudi defense ministry meeting that launched the maritime alliance brought dozens of countries and the European Union into the discussion.
Fourteen countries signed the founding joint statement; thirteen completed national procedures and joined fully by mid-August. Members include Bahrain, Bangladesh, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Headquarters sit in Riyadh. Rear Adm. Abdullah bin Salem Al-Shehri was named coalition commander.
| Member | Role or stake |
|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | Founder, host, joint command |
| Sudan | Red Sea littoral, Port Sudan node |
| Turkey | Naval capacity partner |
| Egypt | Littoral and Suez corridor |
| Pakistan | Extra-regional naval depth |
| Djibouti / Somalia / Yemen | Southern approaches and Gulf of Aden |
The trigger was a wave of Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked shipping and infrastructure after the group declared a maritime blockade against the Kingdom in July. The alliance is described as defensive: information sharing, operational planning, joint exercises and collective naval operations. Analysts note prior Red Sea security initiatives often stalled at the political stage; effectiveness will depend on whether the new body generates actual patrols and deterrence.
The same architecture appears in earlier coverage of the Saudi Red Sea alliance launch with founding members and subsequent activation steps for the multinational maritime defense alliance.
Why Port Sudan sits at the center of the calculation
Sudan’s Red Sea coast lies directly opposite Saudi Arabia. Port Sudan remains the SAF’s primary maritime gateway for supplies, fuel and diplomacy while the army holds Khartoum and central Al Jazirah after 2025 gains. The Rapid Support Forces under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) still dominate Darfur and parts of Kordofan, the belt that separates SAF-held east and center from the west.
Renewed RSF drone strikes around Khartoum and heavier fighting in Kordofan have kept pressure on the corridor that links the capital region to the coast. For the SAF, a standing Saudi-Turkish umbrella over the Red Sea reduces the risk that Houthi or other disruptions cut the last reliable sea line. For Riyadh and Ankara, a cooperative Sudanese coast denies a vacuum that could favor the UAE-aligned RSF or other spoilers.
UN experts and Western officials have accused the United Arab Emirates of supplying the RSF; Abu Dhabi denies the charge. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have steadily increased political, financial and military backing for Burhan’s camp. The new council and staff talks convert that preference into routines that survive individual summits.
Second-order effects already visible on the ground
The dual visits do more than signal friendship. They tighten the western shore of the new maritime order at the moment the coalition moves from declaration to activation. Several concrete consequences follow.
- Port Sudan gains a thicker layer of political cover and potential naval coordination that the RSF cannot easily match from Darfur.
- SAF logistics through the Red Sea become harder for outside actors to interdict without confronting the broader alliance.
- UAE-RSF channels face a more consolidated Saudi-Turkish-Egyptian counter-weight along the same waterway.
- Civilian political forces inside Sudan hear a clearer message that the army’s external partners prefer continuity under Burhan for now.
Salem used the Riyadh platform to urge Sudanese civilian and political groups to unite around national priorities and drop agendas that fracture the home front. He accused the RSF of seeking demographic change. Whether that call produces a genuine national dialogue remains open; the external security architecture is already hardening.
A short timeline of the realignment
- April 2023, War erupts between SAF and RSF; Jeddah talks later hosted by Saudi Arabia.
- June 2, 2026, Burhan meets Erdogan in Ankara.
- July 28, 2026, Salem meets Fidan; diplomatic academy memorandum signed.
- July 30, 2026, Saudi Arabia unveils Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance plans; 14 countries issue supporting statement.
- Mid-August 2026, Coalition moves to institutional activation with 13 full members; commander appointed.
- August 17, 2026, Salem signs Coordination Council in Riyadh; Elatta holds Ankara staff talks; Erdogan reiterates backing for Burhan.
The pattern shows progressive institutionalization rather than one-off visits. Earlier periods when Saudi Arabia faced Houthi fire with fewer partners underscored the value Riyadh now places on a wider coastal coalition that includes Sudan.
What the coastal bet still leaves unresolved
The Coordination Council and the military channel with Turkey strengthen SAF rear areas and Red Sea access. They do not end the fighting in Kordofan or Darfur, nor do they resolve the humanitarian catastrophe that has made Sudan one of the world’s worst crises. Civilian consensus inside Sudan remains fragile. The coalition itself is still proving whether joint exercises and information sharing will produce a durable deterrent against Houthi or other threats.
For now the army leadership in Port Sudan and Khartoum has traded wartime isolation for a seat inside a Saudi-Turkish security net that treats the western Red Sea shore as shared infrastructure. That bargain is already shaping how supplies move, how backers choose sides, and how long the current military balance can hold.
