Israeli Concerns Over Egypt’s New 1,500 km Jabbar 150 Drone

Israeli media have raised concerns over Egypt’s new 1,500 km Jabbar 150 drone, a one-way attack platform modeled on Iran’s Shahed-136 and unveiled at the EDEX 2025 defense exhibition in Cairo. The concern, surfaced by Israeli media and reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, has come nearly six months after the drone’s public debut. It lands at a moment when the regional drone race has moved from a curiosity to a strategic variable.

The trigger sits in Egypt’s open break with Iran. On Wednesday, Cairo condemned Iranian attacks on Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait “in the strongest terms” and pledged full solidarity with the three states. The condition Egypt has set for restoring full diplomatic relations with Tehran is the one Iran now appears to have violated: that Iran must not threaten the security of the Gulf or the wider region.

The Drone Israel Is Watching

Israeli media have raised concern over the Jabbar 150 “despite having been unveiled nearly six [months ago],” Asharq Al-Awsat reported. The publication of Israeli media’s report on the Jabbar 150 concerns lands in the same week that Egypt publicly broke with Iran over Tehran’s attacks on three Arab states. The new variable is a 1,500 km strike platform sitting in an already-saturated neighborhood.

What Israeli concerns center on, per Asharq’s reporting, is the drone’s “operational capabilities rather than the origins of its technology.” The platform is Egyptian-built by the private firm Tornex and was first shown at EDEX 2025 in Cairo. The Asharq sidebar on the drone puts its range at 1,500 km and notes a warhead of about 50 kilograms. The design lineage is visible: the airframe draws significant design inspiration from Iran’s Shahed-136. The worry in Jerusalem is operational in nature.

The 1,500 km range reshapes the regional math. From Cairo, that circle covers Tel Aviv, the Iranian plateau, the Eastern Mediterranean coastline, and the Horn of Africa. The Ahram factbox on the drone family lists a top speed of 200 km/h, a 10-hour endurance, and a 150 kg maximum take-off weight. Asharq’s sidebar on the drone carries the warhead figure, at about 50 kilograms.

The Israeli concern is about an Egyptian operator with a Shahed-class system at a moment when the original Shahed is already reshaping missile defense budgets. The deployment question is the open one for Israel.

A Shahed-Style Strike Drone, Made in Egypt

The Defense Post framed the December 2025 EDEX unveiling as Egypt “officially joining the long-range strike-drone race” with the Jabbar-150. WANA’s reporting on the same event described the airframe as drawing “significant design inspiration from Iran’s well-known Shahed-136 drone.” The Shahed-136 itself is built around a delta-wing airframe and a small piston engine, giving it an operational range of up to 2,000 km. The Shahed carries a 20- to 40-kilogram high-explosive warhead, “though reported hit rates remain below 10 percent,” per the Defense Post. The Egyptian variant of the design arrived at a regional defense exhibition in Cairo in late 2025.

The Jabbar 150 sits inside a three-variant family that Ahram laid out in the full Jabbar drone family specifications. The Jabbar 200 stretches to 2,000 km of range, a 14-hour endurance, and a 40-50 kg payload. The Jabbar 250 adds a turbojet engine and a 576 km/h top speed for high-speed target simulation.

Variant Engine MTOW Max speed Max range Endurance
Jabbar-150 Piston 150 kg 200 km/h 1,500 km 10 hours
Jabbar-200 Piston 200 kg ~200 km/h 2,000 km 14 hours
Jabbar-250 Turbojet 250 kg 576 km/h 1,500 km 2.5 hours

The Shahed-136 lineage matters because the Iranian drone has become one of the most-deployed strike platforms of the past decade. Russia fielded the design in Ukraine; Iran used the airframe concept in attacks on Gulf states. The Defense Post’s review of the Shahed-136 puts the threat in cost-asymmetry terms: cheap drones drain expensive interceptor stockpiles. The Jabbar 150 sits inside that same cost curve, in a country now publicly picking a side against Iran.

Cairo Picks a Side Against Tehran

On June 10, 2026, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry condemned Iranian attacks on Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait “in the strongest terms,” per Egypt’s full solidarity statement with the three attacked states. The statement was the sharpest Egyptian condemnation of Iranian military action to date. It was issued the same day Ahram dated its dispatch.

The language left little room for hedging. Egypt called the attacks “a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these sisterly states and a highly dangerous escalation that threatens the security and stability of the entire region.” Cairo “reaffirmed its full solidarity with the sisterly nations of Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait in confronting these unacceptable attacks,” aligning with Saudi Arabia’s response to Iran’s strikes on Bahrain. Egypt stressed that the security of Arab states is “an integral part of Egyptian and Arab national security” and rejected “any actions or practices that undermine state sovereignty or threaten territorial integrity and security.”

The trigger, per Ahram, was a sequence that started with US strikes on Iranian targets after Washington said an army helicopter was downed by Iranian drones over Hormuz. Iran then launched missile and drone attacks on US-linked facilities in Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait. Jordan reported intercepting several missiles, with Gulf states activating air defenses.

Egypt’s standing condition for full diplomatic normalization with Tehran is that Iran must not threaten Gulf security. Tarek Fahmy, a political science professor at Cairo University, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the regional-security demand and the non-interference requirement were the substantive Egyptian conditions, beyond any symbolic gesture. That street, named for the assassin of President Anwar Sadat, was renamed by Iran in a goodwill gesture, but Egyptian officials “stressed that this was not the basis of Egypt’s demands for restoring relations with Iran.” The domestic pressure of the Iran war on Egypt is documented in the reporting on Egypt’s fuel and inflation hit from the Iran war. The June 10 condemnation put those standing conditions on the public record.

The Sisi-Pezeshkian Phone Calls

In March, the two presidents spoke by phone. On March 13, 2026, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took a call from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and “affirmed Egypt’s categorical condemnation and rejection of Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states, Jordan, and Iraq,” per Sisi’s March 13 statement to President Pezeshkian. Sisi stressed the targeted nations had “contributed to de-escalation efforts and supported the Iranian-US negotiations to reach a diplomatic solution to the crisis.” Pezeshkian, in turn, expressed appreciation for Egypt’s de-escalation efforts and affirmed Iran’s participation in nuclear-program negotiations.

A second call followed on May 26, 2026, per Egypt Today. That conversation focused on the “ongoing efforts to reach a memorandum of understanding between the American and Iranian sides.” Sisi “reiterated Egypt’s position calling for peaceful settlement to all regional crises and its categorical rejection of any infringement on the sovereignty of the Gulf states or threats to their territorial integrity.” The two presidents exchanged Eid al-Adha greetings at the end of the call. The diplomatic register held firm across both calls. The negotiating track shifted between March and May; the conditions did not.

  1. 1979 – Egypt severs diplomatic relations with Iran after the Iranian revolution.
  2. 1990 – Relations resume at the chargé d’affaires level, 11 years after the severing.
  3. May 2023 – Iranian presidential directive instructs the Foreign Ministry to take the necessary steps to strengthen relations with Egypt.
  4. October 2024 – Sisi meets Iran’s late president Ebrahim Raisi and current president Masoud Pezeshkian on the BRICS summit sidelines in Russia.
  5. March 13, 2026 – Sisi tells Pezeshkian by phone that Egypt “categorically condemns” Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, Jordan and Iraq.
  6. May 26, 2026 – Sisi and Pezeshkian speak by phone, focused on US-Iran negotiations; Sisi reiterates his categorical rejection of any infringement on Gulf sovereignty.
  7. June 10, 2026 – Egypt’s Foreign Ministry condemns Iranian attacks on Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait “in the strongest terms.”

Why the Message Stung

Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed El-Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is little room at present for further development in Egypt-Iran relations. He framed the regional moment as one of “maintaining only the minimum level of relations necessary to manage the situation, reduce tensions and prevent further escalation.”

El-Orabi pushed back on Tehran’s framing of the relationship. The situation, he said, “is not as dynamic as Tehran portrays it.” Contacts and consultations exist but are “aimed at addressing concerns that could further destabilize the region, not at deepening relations.” Egypt’s condemnation of Iran’s attacks on Gulf states has been received in Tehran, and “that message has reached Iran, which is now trying to restore the level of rapprochement that existed before the current war.”

The message has reached Iran, and Tehran has taken notice of it. It is now working to address the issue in an effort to restore the trajectory of relations with Cairo.

Tarek Fahmy, professor of political science and international relations at Cairo University, said in the same Asharq Al-Awsat interview that Egypt had approached Iran cautiously even before the current war because of a longstanding lack of trust. The renaming of Islambouli Street in Cairo, named for the assassin of President Anwar Sadat, was treated by Egyptian officials as a goodwill gesture, not the basis for restored relations. “Egyptian officials stressed that this was not the basis of Egypt’s demands for restoring relations with Iran,” Fahmy said. The substantive Egyptian demands were regional security, Gulf states’ security, and non-interference in Arab affairs. Iran’s current attacks on Gulf states have placed those conditions in direct conflict with Iranian behavior.

On Iran’s strategic calculation, Fahmy said Tehran wants Egypt involved in any current or future negotiations with the United States, Israel, or the International Atomic Energy Agency. The reason is Cairo’s credibility and its ability to maintain channels with all sides. “Tehran understands that its negotiations cannot rely on Pakistan alone,” he said.

Iran is working to restore the trajectory of relations with Cairo, in Fahmy’s telling. But Cairo has set a clear bar. “Egypt will not take that step unless stability and balance are restored in the Gulf and the region as a whole,” he said. Egypt’s two Sisi-Pezeshkian phone calls and the June 10 Foreign Ministry statement have now made that condition a public, stated position.

Tehran’s Path Back

Tehran’s response on the diplomatic track came the same week. On Monday, Iran’s mission in Cairo announced that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had met in Tehran with Mojtaba Ferdowsi, head of Iran’s Interests Section in Cairo, to discuss the course of bilateral relations. Per the mission, Ferdowsi briefed Araghchi on the latest developments in relations between the two countries, as well as ongoing political contacts and cooperation in several fields. Araghchi emphasized the importance of continuing bilateral consultations, adding that Egypt-Iran relations had made “notable progress” in recent years. He framed continuous dialogue and consultation between Cairo and Tehran as “an important pillar in supporting efforts for peace and stability in the Middle East.”

The strategic logic on Iran’s side runs through Egypt’s mediation value. According to Fahmy, Iran views Egypt as a key stabilizing force for regional security and wants Cairo involved in any current or future negotiations with the United States, Israel, or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Head of Iran’s Interests Section Mojtaba Ferdowsi told Middle East Monitor that Iran’s main concern is that Egypt should not become involved in any action supporting Israel in its conflict with Tehran.

Iran’s interest in Cairo as mediator runs up against the condition Sisi has now stated twice. Cairo’s path back to full diplomatic normalization with Tehran requires Iran to meet the conditions Egypt laid out before the war. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty is holding parallel contacts with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, and several Arab counterparts, per Ahram Online. Egypt’s standing condition for normalization with Iran is that Iran must not threaten the security of the Gulf or the wider region.

  • 1,500 km – the Jabbar 150’s maximum range (Ahram factbox).
  • ~50 kg – the warhead weight reported for the Jabbar 150 (Asharq sidebar).
  • 1979 / 1990 – years Egypt severed and then resumed relations with Iran (Asharq).
  • May 2023 – the Iranian presidential directive to strengthen ties with Egypt (Asharq).
  • 384 – drone-breach incidents recorded by the IDF’s Paran Brigade on the Israel-Egypt border between July 16 and August 25, per Israel’s 384-drone-breach count on the southern border.

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