Gulf Monarchies Rethink Power and Loyalty After Iran Strike on Qatar

Left on the Sidelines, Gulf States Eye a Bigger Diplomatic Role in a War-Changed Middle East

They spent billions on defense, courted both Washington and Tehran, and hosted U.S. bases in the name of strategic deterrence. But when missiles lit up the skies over the Gulf in June 2025, the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar were little more than bystanders — targets, even — in a war they couldn’t control.

Iran’s retaliatory strike on the American airbase in Qatar was limited, sure, but it made one thing painfully clear to Gulf leaders: no matter how much they invest or align themselves with powerful allies, they remain dangerously exposed. Now, as the dust settles, they’re trying to rewrite their role in a shifting region — less as pawns and more as players.

Trump’s Praise and the Sting of History

The Gulf states got a front-row seat to a geopolitical drama, but no script, no voice, and no guarantee of protection. And that stings.

When President Donald Trump visited Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi in May 2025, just weeks before the conflict erupted, the Gulf leaders hoped that years of partnership would grant them influence. But during the war, their calls for restraint fell flat.

Two sentences from Trump still echo across Gulf foreign ministries: “Iran was very nice” — his words after Tehran’s ballistic strike hit the U.S. base in Qatar but avoided civilian areas. To Gulf leaders, it felt like déjà vu.

Back in September 2019, Iran attacked Aramco oil facilities. The U.S. didn’t retaliate then either.

This time around, once again:

• An Iranian attack happened on Gulf soil.

• The U.S. shrugged.

• The Gulf states were left wondering how real their security guarantees really are.

One Gulf official, speaking to local media off the record, put it bluntly: “It’s like we’re hosting the party, but someone else controls the guest list, the music, and the fights.”

Big Defense Budgets, Small Influence

The Gulf states have some of the biggest defense budgets per capita in the world. Yet, when war came knocking, their militaries stood still.

Saudi Arabia spends an estimated 7.3% of its GDP on defense, while the UAE isn’t far behind. But those shiny F-15s and Patriot missile systems didn’t grant them leverage during the June conflict. The problem? These militaries were built more for prestige and deterrence — not for actual warfighting, especially not a regional showdown involving Iran, Israel, and the U.S.

Even Qatar, which hosts Al Udeid, the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East, found itself caught in the middle. And despite that direct hit, Doha’s diplomatic influence couldn’t alter Washington’s calculus.

This disconnect between spending and strategic value is glaring.

Diplomatic Doors Reopening — Cautiously

With the missiles now grounded — at least for the Gulf — the monarchies are sliding back into a more comfortable role: diplomacy.

Saudi Arabia has restarted backchannel discussions with Iran through Oman. The UAE is refocusing on trade routes and energy diplomacy, especially with Asian powers. Qatar, as always, is playing the mediator, offering itself as a bridge between Tehran and Washington.

But the political tone has shifted.

Gulf officials no longer pretend they’re “balancing” between the U.S. and Iran. That narrative cracked when Iranian missiles flew across their airspace. Now it’s about minimizing fallout, not building alliances.

Here’s where their leverage still holds:

• Oil markets: A spike in oil prices post-June war showed how quickly Gulf exports can swing global inflation.

• Investment: Sovereign wealth funds like Saudi’s PIF and Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala still attract global suitors.

• Media: Channels like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya shape global perceptions of the conflict.

Still, there’s a growing feeling in Gulf capitals that they need more than soft power.

Gulf Perspectives on Israel Are Shifting — Quietly

The Hamas attack in 2023 had already stirred unease. But after the June 2025 war, Gulf monarchies are reevaluating their stance on Israel, and not entirely in its favor.

The Abraham Accords are still technically alive, but they’re now being tested by public opinion. While governments maintain formal ties, especially the UAE and Bahrain, the street sentiment is heating up — especially as images from Gaza’s humanitarian crisis flood social media.

In Riyadh, there’s been a notable pause in normalization efforts. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, once open to broader ties with Israel, is keeping a lower profile on that front. That’s no coincidence.

Meanwhile, across Gulf think tanks, analysts are quietly recalibrating their assessments:

Washington Wants Help. Gulf States Want Respect.

Post-war, the U.S. is floating new regional plans — from Syria stabilization to nuclear talks with Iran. Gulf support would be useful. But this time, they want a seat at the table, not just an invite after the decisions are made.

Gulf leaders feel Washington no longer understands their threat landscape. For them, deterrence isn’t just about tanks or jets. It’s about being heard — before the bombs start falling.

So what do they want?

• Deeper consultation before military action.

• Stronger clarity on defense guarantees.

• Joint planning for regional crises.

But they also know that American attention is finite, especially during an election year. If the Gulf feels sidelined again, don’t be surprised if China or Russia find new openings.

One War Ended. The Power Games Didn’t.

There may not be bombs dropping over Riyadh or Dubai right now. But geopolitics doesn’t take a break.

The June 2025 war reminded the Gulf monarchies that peace doesn’t mean stability — and money doesn’t mean control. Now, they’re rewriting their roles, their alliances, and maybe even their identities in a Middle East that’s far less predictable than it was just two years ago.