Cairo and Brussels have quietly ramped up efforts to build a Palestinian police corps for Gaza, racing to train thousands of officers ahead of a planned international stabilisation effort that would sit at the center of a US-led postwar plan for the Strip.
Training on the ground: Egypt moves first and fast
Egypt has already begun moving cohorts of Gazans through police courses, officials say, part of a wider scheme that could eventually put as many as 5,000 recruits through Cairo’s academies. These workshops resumed this autumn after an initial group trained earlier in the year.
The Egyptian push fills a clear gap. Jordan had a preexisting program but lacked capacity; Washington reportedly welcomed Egypt’s proposal to scale up training at its police academy.
Palestinian Authority officials have suggested bigger targets — some reports point to plans for as many as 10,000 officers overall, split between Egyptian and other training streams. That ambition reflects hopes that a local, PA-paid force can offer the kind of familiarity with Gaza society that outside troops cannot.
Yet the exact makeup of these recruits is unsettled: how many will come from Gaza itself, how many from the West Bank, and whether any members with past Hamas ties will be included remains politically fraught. Egyptian trainers, PA officials and diplomats insist the force will be largely Gazan and not affiliated with Hamas — a claim that some outside monitors question.
There’s also a practical issue: years of conflict have thinned the pool of experienced PA officers in Gaza, and many former police personnel are reportedly too old or unfit for frontline duties, meaning training programs must do more than refresh old skills — they must create capable cadres from scratch.
The EU’s calculations: training, influence and political strings
Brussels is considering a major role too, proposing to train roughly 3,000 officers under a program modelled on its West Bank mission (EUPOL COPPS). The EU has discussed expanding existing civilian missions and even deploying trainers to Egypt or neighbouring sites.
The bloc’s involvement is as much about policy influence as policing. European officials see training as a lever to shape Gaza’s postwar security architecture and to ensure civilian oversight, rule-of-law standards and human-rights safeguards are part of any local force. That matters politically: the EU funds much of the PA’s payroll, and training would expand Brussels’ footprint.
A few points to keep in mind:
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The EU’s plan would use Common Foreign and Security Policy funding and lean on existing missions such as EUPOL COPPS and the border mission EUBAM Rafah to expand mandates and logistics.
This infusion of European resources is meant to signal weight behind the U.S.-backed plan’s civilian components — but it also raises diplomatic friction with actors who distrust deeper Western involvement or favour alternative postwar designs.
Who will be vetted — and who decides?
Vetting is central to any deployment. The UN-backed blueprint that endorsed the US plan authorises an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and references a new Palestinian police element to work alongside it. The Security Council resolution gives the idea political cover but leaves operational details vague.
Vetting responsibilities are expected to involve Israel and the United States, officials say, but the practical mechanics — who screens records, which criteria apply, and how appeals work — are not finalised. That uncertainty is a major impediment to a swift rollout.
Here’s a quick snapshot of current planning inputs:
| Issue | Status / Reported Plan |
|---|---|
| UNSC backing | Resolution endorsing US “Comprehensive Plan” and authorising ISF. |
| Egyptian training | Initial cohorts trained; target ~5,000 in Egypt. |
| EU role | Proposal to train ~3,000 officers; expand EUPOL COPPS/EUBAM Rafah. |
| Vetting | Intended Israeli-US role; procedures not finalised. |
This table underlines the messy middle: political endorsement exists, but the operational nuts and bolts are still under construction.
Political risks and practical limits as the clock ticks
The plan’s timeline is ambitious. U.S. officials reportedly hope the ISF and complementary police units can start appearing early in 2026, but many governments that might provide troops to the ISF are wary — fearing direct confrontation with armed Gazan actors or unclear rules of engagement. Those reservations have slowed offers of contributors.
That hesitancy helps explain why Egypt and the EU are accelerating police training now: a locally recruited force could shoulder everyday law enforcement sooner and reduce pressure on prospective ISF contributors. Still, training alone won’t dissolve Hamas’s political roots or the armed groups that have filled security vacuums during the conflict.
Adding to the strain are competing narratives about who should be included. Some reports mention proposals to fold local militias into the new apparatus — an idea that critics warn could institutionalise criminal or irregular elements and undermine legitimacy. Analysts caution that ill-considered integration risks trading one fractious security ecology for another.Finally, there’s popular legitimacy. A force trained abroad and paid by the Palestinian Authority may struggle to win hearts and minds if Gazans view it as imposed by outsiders or aligned too closely with rival factions. Police that lack local trust will face a daily policing problem and a political one. That’s the catch: security structures can be built fast; trust takes longer.
